Negations in syllogistic reasoning: Evidence for a heuristic–analytic conflict

An experiment utilizing response time measures was conducted to test dominant processing strategies in syllogistic reasoning with the expanded quantifier set proposed by Roberts (2005). Through adding negations to existing quantifiers it is possible to change problem surface features without altering logical validity. Biases based on surface features such as atmosphere, matching, and the probability heuristics model (PHM; Chater & Oaksford, 1999; Wetherick & Gilhooly, 1995) would not be expected to show variance in response latencies, but participant responses should be highly sensitive to changes in the surface features of the quantifiers. In contrast, according to analytic accounts such as mental models theory and mental logic (e.g., Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991; Rips, 1994) participants should exhibit increased response times for negated premises, but not be overly impacted upon by the surface features of the conclusion. Data indicated that the dominant response strategy was based on a matching heuristic, but also provided evidence of a resource-demanding analytic procedure for dealing with double negatives. The authors propose that dual-process theories offer a stronger account of these data whereby participants employ competing heuristic and analytic strategies and fall back on a heuristic response when analytic processing fails

Effect of Exchange Interaction on Spin Dephasing in a Double Quantum Dot

We measure singlet-triplet dephasing in a two-electron double quantum dot in the presence of an exchange interaction which can be electrically tuned from much smaller to much larger than the hyperfine energy. Saturation of dephasing and damped oscillations of the spin correlator as a function of time are observed when the two interaction strengths are comparable. Both features of the data are compared with predictions from a quasistatic model of the hyperfine field.Comment: see related papers at http://marcuslab.harvard.ed

Reasoning from connectives and relations between entities

This article reports investigations of inferences that depend both on connectives between clauses, such as or else, and on relations between entities, such as in the same place as. Participants made more valid inferences from biconditionals—for instance, Ann is taller than Beth if and only if Beth is taller than Cath—than from exclusive disjunctions (Exp. 1). They made more valid transitive inferences from a biconditional when a categorical premise affirmed rather than denied one of its clauses, but they made more valid transitive inferences from an exclusive disjunction when a categorical premise denied rather than affirmed one of its clauses (Exp. 2). From exclusive disjunctions, such as Either Ann is not in the same place as Beth or else Beth is not in the same place as Cath, individuals tended to infer that all three individuals could be in different places, whereas in fact this was impossible (Exps. 3a and 3b). The theory of mental models predicts all of these results

Artificial Brains and Hybrid Minds

The paper develops two related thought experiments exploring variations on an ‘animat’ theme. Animats are hybrid devices with both artificial and biological components. Traditionally, ‘components’ have been construed in concrete terms, as physical parts or constituent material structures. Many fascinating issues arise within this context of hybrid physical organization. However, within the context of functional/computational theories of mentality, demarcations based purely on material structure are unduly narrow. It is abstract functional structure which does the key work in characterizing the respective ‘components’ of thinking systems, while the ‘stuff’ of material implementation is of secondary importance. Thus the paper extends the received animat paradigm, and investigates some intriguing consequences of expanding the conception of bio-machine hybrids to include abstract functional and semantic structure. In particular, the thought experiments consider cases of mind-machine merger where there is no physical Brain-Machine Interface: indeed, the material human body and brain have been removed from the picture altogether. The first experiment illustrates some intrinsic theoretical difficulties in attempting to replicate the human mind in an alternative material medium, while the second reveals some deep conceptual problems in attempting to create a form of truly Artificial General Intelligence

The evolution of representation in simple cognitive networks

Representations are internal models of the environment that can provide guidance to a behaving agent, even in the absence of sensory information. It is not clear how representations are developed and whether or not they are necessary or even essential for intelligent behavior. We argue here that the ability to represent relevant features of the environment is the expected consequence of an adaptive process, give a formal definition of representation based on information theory, and quantify it with a measure R. To measure how R changes over time, we evolve two types of networks---an artificial neural network and a network of hidden Markov gates---to solve a categorization task using a genetic algorithm. We find that the capacity to represent increases during evolutionary adaptation, and that agents form representations of their environment during their lifetime. This ability allows the agents to act on sensorial inputs in the context of their acquired representations and enables complex and context-dependent behavior. We examine which concepts (features of the environment) our networks are representing, how the representations are logically encoded in the networks, and how they form as an agent behaves to solve a task. We conclude that R should be able to quantify the representations within any cognitive system, and should be predictive of an agent's long-term adaptive success.Comment: 36 pages, 10 figures, one Tabl

CAD revisited: Effects of the word moral on the moral relevance of disgust (and other emotions)

The CAD model posits a mapping of contempt, anger, and disgust onto the moral codes of community, autonomy, and divinity, respectively. A recent study by Hutcherson and Gross posited moral disgust as the dominant other-condemning emotion across all three moral codes. However, the methodology used may have incidentally increased the relevance of disgust. In the current experiment, one condition repeated Hutcherson and Gross’s procedure, while in another condition, the authors added the word moral to three other emotions. Consistent with CAD, anger had the highest intensity ratings in response to autonomy violations, whereas "grossed out" was the dominant response to divinity violations. Furthermore, the adjective "moral" increased the relevance of anger, contempt, and fear in irrelevant domains, which suggests that the adjective moral increases any emotion’s moral relevance

The transcriptomic evolution of mammalian pregnancy:gene expression innovations in endometrial stromal fibroblasts

The endometrial stromal fibroblast (ESF) is a cell type present in the uterine lining of therian mammals. In the stem lineage of eutherian mammals, ESF acquired the ability to differentiate into decidual cells in order to allow embryo implantation. We call the latter cell type “neo-ESF” in contrast to “paleo-ESF” which is homologous to eutherian ESF but is not able to decidualize. In this study, we compare the transcriptomes of ESF from six therian species: Opossum (Monodelphis domestica; paleo-ESF), mink, rat, rabbit, human (all neo-ESF), and cow (secondarily nondecidualizing neo-ESF). We find evidence for strong stabilizing selection on transcriptome composition suggesting that the expression of approximately 5,600 genes is maintained by natural selection. The evolution of neo-ESF from paleo-ESF involved the following gene expression changes: Loss of expression of genes related to inflammation and immune response, lower expression of genes opposing tissue invasion, increased markers for proliferation as well as the recruitment of FOXM1, a key gene transiently expressed during decidualization. Signaling pathways also evolve rapidly and continue to evolve within eutherian lineages. In the bovine lineage, where invasiveness and decidualization were secondarily lost, we see a re-expression of genes found in opossum, most prominently WISP2, and a loss of gene expression related to angiogenesis. The data from this and previous studies support a scenario, where the proinflammatory paleo-ESF was reprogrammed to express anti-inflammatory genes in response to the inflammatory stimulus coming from the implanting conceptus and thus paving the way for extended, trans-cyclic gestation

Mentalizing under Uncertainty: Dissociated Neural Responses to Ambiguous and Unambiguous Mental State Inferences

The ability to read the minds of others (i.e., to mentalize) requires that perceivers understand a wide range of different kinds of mental states, including not only others’ beliefs and knowledge but also their feelings, desires, and preferences. Moreover, although such inferences may occasionally rely on observable features of a situation, perceivers more typically mentalize under conditions of “uncertainty,” in which they must generate plausible hypotheses about a target's mental state from ambiguous or otherwise underspecified information. Here, we use functional neuroimaging to dissociate the neural bases of these 2 distinct social–cognitive challenges: 1) mentalizing about different types of mental states (beliefs vs. preferences) and 2) mentalizing under conditions of varying ambiguity. Although these 2 aspects of mentalizing have typically been confounded in earlier research, we observed a double dissociation between the brain regions sensitive to type of mental state and ambiguity. Whereas ventral and dorsal aspects of medial prefrontal cortex responded more during ambiguous than unambiguous inferences regardless of the type of mental state, the right temporoparietal junction was sensitive to the distinction between beliefs and preferences irrespective of certainty. These results underscore the emerging consensus that, rather than comprising a single mental operation, social cognition makes flexible use of different processes as a function of the particular demands of the social context